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Introduction
From the last quarter of 1989 until 2001, over 1 million immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) arrived in Israel, increasing its population and labor force by extraordinary rates. At the peak of the immigration wave in 1990 and 1991, over 330 thousand FSU Jews immigrated to Israel, increasing Israel's potential labor force by 8 percent and its population by 15 percent. In addition to its size, another unique aspect of this immigration wave is that many of the immigrants were highly educated. About 60 percent of the FSU immigrants who arrived between 1989-1990 were college-educated and almost one-fourth were college graduates. In contrast, only about 30 percent of the native Israeli Jews in 1990 were college educated, and 12 percent were college graduates.
Much of the previous work on the impact of immigration on the host economy's labor market has found that wages are only mildly negatively affected by the influx of competing workers.
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In this paper, I use a unique data set on Israeli manufacturing firms and investigate directly whether firms and industries with a higher concentration of immigrants experienced increases in productivity. The analysis is carried out by running conventional production function regressions, where the share of immigrants is treated as an additional right hand side variable. This econometric specification is obtained directly from microeconomic principles if one assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, perfect substitutability between native and immigrant labor, with possible differences in the efficiency units of labor provided by native and immigrant workers.
The analysis reveals a number of interesting results: First, despite their high levels of formal education, immigrants were initially employed in low-skill occupations, and moved up the occupational ladder only a number of years after arrival. This is consistent with evidence from other studies that used individual-level data. Second, a firm's immigrant share in 1993, shortly after the peak of the immigration wave, can be predicted by a number of pre-immigration firm characteristics: firms that in 1990 had a high capital/labor ratio, paid low wages and were in industries with a low-educated workforce employed a relatively high share of immigrants. Immigrants were less likely to be employed in firms with a high share of output in highly concentrated industries, consistent with models of queuing in the labor market. By 1997, many of these correlations were weakened or reversed. Third, in cross-sectional and pooled OLS production function regressions, I find no evidence that the immigrant share is correlated with productivity. First-differences estimates reveal, if anything, a negative correlation between the change in output per worker and the change in the immigrant share. Fourth, the immigrant share was strongly negatively correlated with productivity in low-tech 3 industries. In high-tech industries, the results are somewhat mixed, but tend to point to a positive relationship, hinting at complementarities between technology and the skilled immigrant workforce. This paper's contribution is threefold. First, it joins the growing the literature that attempts to understand how firms and industries respond to migration waves. Lewis (2003) finds that relative labor supply shocks have little effect on the local industry mix; instead, industries respond to these shocks by changing their relative factor intensities. Lewis (2006) further corroborates these findings by showing that in markets with a higher availability of less-skilled labor manufacturing plants are less likely to introduce automated production techniques. Lewis argues that these endogenous changes in production techniques may explain why wages of unskilled workers have been found not to respond to large immigration-induced labor supply shocks. Gandal, Hanson and Slaughter (2004) obtain similar results in the Israeli context: they find that global changes in production techniques were sufficient to more than offset Israel's change in relative factor supplies induced by the Soviet immigration, while changes in output mix did not help Israel absorb changes in relative factor prices. These studies, however, did not have micro data on the distribution of immigrants across establishments, and therefore could not investigate directly the effect of immigrants on plant productivity. To my knowledge, Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002) are the only ones to estimate directly the effects of immigration on firm productivity. Using state-level data, they find that labor productivity increased more slowly in states that attracted a larger share of immigrants in the 1980s, both in low-skill and high-skill industries. The current study improves on the existing 4 literature by exploiting information on immigrant concentration at the firm level, a unique feature of my data set.
The second strand of literature to which this paper is related is the one on the effects of a highly educated workforce on labor productivity. Moretti (2004) finds robust evidence of educational spillovers in U.S. manufacturing: the productivity of plants in cities that experience large increases in the share of college graduates rises more than the productivity of similar plants in cities that experience small increases in the share of college graduates. Exploiting the longitudinal nature of his data, Moretti can address the most relevant endogeneity and selectivity issues by including plant and city fixed effects:
however, his data cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that time-varying productivity shocks are correlated with changes in the overall level of human capital in a city. One advantage of my study is that it allows to investigate the productivity effects of the large, unexpected, and arguably exogenous shock to the stock of human capital represented by the Soviet immigration to Israel. 2 Finally, the paper helps understanding the determinants of growth in the Israeli economy in the 19990s. Hercowitz (1998), and Hercowitz, Lavi and Melnick (1999) , using macroeconomic time series data up to 1995, find that immigration has a negative short-run impact on TFP growth. They interpret these results as a consequence of the immigrants' slow process of adjustment to the labor market, implicitly arguing that TFP should have picked up once the adjustment process had been completed. My paper sheds light on this issue by extending the analysis to the end of the decade: this is a particularly interesting period of analysis, because by this time the most difficult part of the 5 immigrants' adjustment process had already been completed, and because the Israeli economy experienced a surge in productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents some general macroeconomic trends in the Israeli economy between 1970 and 1999, and in the manufacturing sector in particular. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the distribution of immigrants across firms and industries in 1993 and 1997. Section 5 presents the basic estimates of the production function, as well as additional robustness tests and specification tests. Section 6 concludes. Table 1 presents the average yearly growth rates in total output per worker and in total factor productivity, by decade, between 1970 and 1999. 3 Output per worker and total factor productivity grew at a sustained and similar rate during the 1970s, but growth slowed down considerably during the 1980s. In the 1990s, the growth rate picked up again, with the manufacturing sector leading the charge in both output per worker and TFP. Figure 1 presents the evolution of output per worker for the entire Israeli economy and for the manufacturing sector alone, between 1970 and 2000. The two series grew at fairly similar rates between 1970 and 1993, but since then manufacturing output per worker has taken off at a very fast rate, while overall output per worker has remained essentially constant. Figure 2 illustrates that much of the 1990s growth in the manufacturing sector was concentrated in high and medium-high technology industries, 6 even though low and medium-low tech industries also experienced growth in the latter part of the decade.
Israeli Productivity, 1970-1999: Macroeconomic Trends
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At the same time, many of the post-1989 immigrants found employment in the manufacturing sector, as can be seen by immigrants, a phenomenon which has already been studied extensively in the literature (Weiss, Sauer and Gotlibovsky, 2003; Weiss, 2002 and 2004) .
Summing up, it appears that the manufacturing sector as a whole, and in particular high technology industries within this sector, were the main engines of growth in the Israeli economy in the latter part of the 1990s. At the same time, the manufacturing sector absorbed large numbers of highly educated immigrants, who gradually shifted from blue-collar to white-collar occupations. In the next sections we will try to analyze whether these two phenomena are linked at a more disaggregated level.
Data
The main source of data for my analysis is represented by the 1990-1999
Industrial Surveys conducted annually by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
The survey is a representative sample of manufacturing establishments employing 5 or 8 more persons. Griliches and Regev (1995) used these same surveys to study productivity in Israeli firms during the 1980s.
The Industrial Surveys have been conducted regularly by the CBS since 1955.
The surveys can be viewed as a succession of short panels, since every few years the sampling frame is redesigned and a new sample of establishments is drawn based on probability sampling. Large establishments (with more than 75 employed persons), and a number of smaller establishments in some economic branches are sampled with certainty, while smaller establishments are sampled with a probability determined by establishment size and economic branch. The sampled establishments are then followed for a number of years, until the next sample redesign. In the period I investigate, there were two redesigns of the sample: the 1989 redesign, which is the basis for the 1990-1994 surveys, and the 1994 redesign, which is the basis for the 1995-1999 surveys. Table 3 shows the number of establishments in each survey year, the number of establishments in each year that were surveyed in 1990, and the number of establishments in each year that were present in 1995. As can be seen, more than 800 establishments in the 1995 sample were already present in 1990, and nearly 700 establishments are sampled continuously between 1990
and 1999. The CBS follows standard OECD definitions and classifies all industrial sectors into four different levels of technological intensity. I will also follow this standard classification throughout the paper. Table 4 presents summary statistics on the number of firms, on total employment, and on the composition of the labor force for the four levels of technological intensity. High-technology firms represented 7 percent of the sample in 1990, but employed about 13 percent of the total number of workers in manufacturing.
By 1997, the number of high tech firms in the sample had risen to 9 percent, employing now 16 percent of the manufacturing workforce, a 41 percent increase in the level of employment. Note however that employment growth was not confined to the high-tech sector alone: employment grew by about 6 percent in the low-tech sector, and by about 47 percent in the medium-low tech sector. Table 4 also shows that the OECD classification reflects fairly accurately the educational composition of the workforce:
workers in the high-tech sector have about two and a half more years of schooling than workers in the low tech sector. Moreover, high-tech establishments have a substantial fraction of scientists, and are substantially more likely to invest in R&D.
The distribution of immigrant employment
The unique feature of my analysis is the combination of the standard variables on industrial production with information on the type of workforce employed in each establishment. This information is taken from the supplemental surveys on the Structure of the Labor Force (SLF), which were administered to all firms in the Manufacturing Surveys in 1993 and 1997. These surveys collected information on the total number of scientists, white-collar workers ("academics"), technicians, and production workers employed in each establishment, and on the number of recently arrived immigrants in each one of the above categories. This enables me to analyze the characteristics of firms that employed immigrants, and to study whether firms who employed a large number of highly educated immigrants experienced a boost in productivity. In contrast to the stability of immigrant employment between 1993 and 1997, there were substantial shifts in the occupational distribution of immigrants within firms, as can be seen from Table 6 . The percent of scientists among immigrants more than doubled from 1993 to 1997, going from 4.3 to 9.8 percent. As a result, in 1997 the proportion of immigrants who were scientists was higher than the overall proportion of immigrants in the workforce (15.9 percent versus 15.1percent). Also, by 1997 a substantial fraction of immigrants were employed in white-collar jobs and as technicians, while the share of immigrants employed as production workers declined from nearly 94 percent to about 81.5 percent. These results further confirm that throughout the 1990s immigrants experienced substantial occupational upgrading, as they acquired local labor market skills and were able to convert part of their imported human capital into something valuable for Israeli employers.
We now move to the question of which industries and firms employed immigrants. Figures 3a and 3b show the immigrant distribution across 25 two-digit manufacturing industries. The dark bars represent high and medium-high tech industries, while the light bars represent low and medium-low tech industries. In 1993 there does not seem to be any evident correlation between the technological intensity of the industry, and immigrant concentration. In 1997, the electronic components industry stands out for its high concentration of immigrants, and overall it does seem that there has been a shift of immigrants towards more high-technology sectors.
In Table 7 I investigate directly the determinants of immigrant hiring at the firm level. Specifically, I regress the share of immigrants in the firm, for both 1993 and 1997, on a number of firm characteristics in 1990. This allows me to establish which pre-immigration characteristics of establishments were conducive to the hiring of immigrants.
I include in the regressions a number of standard firm characteristics -dummies for size, the capital-labor ratio, the 1990 average wage, and value added per worker (all in logs).
In addition, I include the concentration level of the industry, the level of competition from imports, and whether the firm enjoys a dominant position within the industry: these variables are meant to capture the fact that maybe workers queue for jobs in firms that enjoy monopoly rents (Katz and Summers, 1990) , and outsiders such as immigrants are less likely to find jobs at these firms. Finally, I include a number of indicators for the skill of the workforce and for technological intensity at the industry level: the average years of schooling in the three-digit industry (taken from the Labor Force Survey in [1989] [1990] ,
whether the firm engages in R&D, and dummies for medium-low, medium-high and high-tech industries. I estimate two specifications, with and without two-digit industry fixed effects. The regression is estimated separately for 1993 and 1997.
The results for 1993 suggest that immigrants were more likely to be employed in medium-sized firms rather than in very small or very large firms, but the differences are small and not always statistically significant. More interesting is the coefficient on the capital-labor ratio, which is positive and significant, confirming the intuitive notion that firms that had room to grow (in the sense that they had a high capital-labor ratio) were more likely to hire immigrants. Interestingly, there does not seem to be any correlation between a firm's productivity in 1990 and its propensity to hire immigrants in 1993.
There is also some evidence that medium-low tech firms were more likely to hire immigrants, and that immigrant employment is negatively correlated with the average years of schooling in the industry in 1990, although this effect disappears when we 13 control for two-digit industry dummies. The coefficients on the industry concentration variables reveal an interesting pattern: immigrants are more likely to be employed in highly concentrated industries, but not in those firms that enjoy a dominant position within the industry. For example, a firm with a 40 percent output share in an industry with a 0.5 three-firm concentration index employs on average 5.7 percent (0.078×0.5 -0.131×0.4 -0.216×0.5×0.4 = -0.057) fewer immigrants than a (hypothetical) firm in a perfectly competitive industry (i.e., infinitely small output share in an industry where the concentration index is zero). By contrast, a firm in the same industry with only 5 percent market share employs on average 2.7 percent more immigrants than its perfectly competitive counterpart. Similarly, firms that were exposed to greater competition from imports were more likely to employ immigrants. Coupled with the coefficients on the wage variable, these results suggest that there may indeed be queuing for jobs in firms that enjoy monopoly rents and immigrants are the ones least likely to be close to the front of the queue.
The results for 1997 paint a slightly different picture: Now I find a positive correlation between immigrant share and the 1990 wage, and a negative correlation between immigrant concentration and productivity in 1990. It still seems to be the case that immigrants are less likely to be employed in firms that enjoy a dominant position in their market, and they are more likely to be employed in firms that face stiff import competition, but the other variables measuring industry concentration now become insignificant.
It is difficult to tell how much of the differences between 1993 and 1997 depend on actual mobility of immigrants between firms, and how much instead depends on the 14 fact that because of the 1995 sample redesign, I can only observe a limited number of establishments (mostly large ones) who were present in both the 1990 and 1997 sample.
The last two columns of Table 7 illustrate this problem: I replicate the regressions for the 1993 sample, but now using only those firms that were present in the sample in both 1993
and 1997. Now essentially all the coefficients become insignificant, and it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the determinants of immigrant hiring at the firm-level.
Summing up, this section has showed that immigrants were distributed over the entire spectrum of Israeli manufacturing firms. In the early 1990s, immigrants were concentrated in firms with room to grow and with low wages (possibly because their access to high paying jobs in firms that enjoy rents is obstructed), but we find little correlation between these firm characteristics and immigrant concentration later in the decade. Two additional findings deserve attention: first, immigrants were not more likely to be employed in high technology firms, which may be viewed as surprising given their high levels of human capital; second, there seems to be little or no correlation between a firm's productivity in 1990 and its propensity to employ immigrants later in the decade.
In the next section, where I examine the effect of immigrants on firm productivity, one should keep in mind that there was no apparent pattern of immigrants selectively sorting themselves into firms based on their level of productivity.
The effect of immigrants on productivity
In this section I estimate a standard production function at the firm level, ( ) is a time-invariant firm specific effect, which is potentially correlated with firm inputs, while u it is an idiosyncratic error term, uncorrelated with firm inputs. Therefore, the estimating framework reduces to a standard production function, with the proportion of immigrants as an additional right hand side variable.
The coefficients in the above equation can be given a causal interpretation if all the unobserved terms are indeed uncorrelated with the inputs, or if the fixed firm effects can be made to drop out of the equation by either first differencing or by subtracting firmspecific means from both sides of the equation (the within estimator). In Table 8 I report the results from cross-sectional and pooled estimation of the production function, while Table 9 presents results from the estimation in first differences. All regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, using as weights the CBS provided sampling weights.
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Basic Results
The coefficients of the production function in Table 8 17 immigrants seems to be completely unrelated to productivity. In all specifications, the coefficient on the share of immigrants is small and insignificant, both statistically and economically. For example, the first column indicates that an increase in the share of immigrants from 0 to 0.1 is associated at most with a 0.44 percentage point increase in labor productivity. At the bottom of the table I present the implied values of the production function parameters. The implied value of μ ranges between -0.123 to 0.067, but it is never statistically significant.
One should be careful in attributing to these results a causal interpretation, because the share of immigrants within a firm may be correlated with unobserved determinants of productivity. In Table 9 , I address the possibility that immigrant concentration was correlated with a fixed unobservable component of firm productivity by estimating the firm's production function in first-differenced form. I estimate the relationship separately for 1990-1993 (assuming that the share of immigrants in all firms was zero in 1990) and 1993-1997, and then pooling both periods together. The first three columns of the table present the results based on the sample of all available firms, while the next three columns restrict attention only to the balanced sample of firms that were surveyed in all three years (1990, 1993 and 1997) . I now find some evidence of an adverse effect of the change in immigrant share on productivity growth for the [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period and for the pooled specification, but the effect disappears in the balanced sample.
In contrast to what seemed to emerge from the time series evidence, at the microeconomic level there is clearly no evidence of a positive effect of immigrant concentration on firm productivity.
Robustness Checks
One possible shortcoming of the above approach is that it uses only information on firm productivity for the years in which we observe the share of immigrants in the firm. Alternatively, one could obtain an estimate of firm productivity using all the available data, and then regress that estimate on the immigrant share. There are a number of different approaches to estimating firm productivity. I use the simplest possible one, namely the factor share approach. 
, where i denotes firms, j denotes industries, and t denotes time. I then regress these measures of total factor productivity on the share of immigrants and on the other elements of the production function. The results are presented in Table 10 . The first column estimates the regression in levels, while the second and third columns use the first-difference specification for the 1993-1997 period, for the full and balanced samples, respectively. Once again, it appears that, if anything, the share of immigrants has a negative effect on firm productivity.
In Table 11 , I perform a series of specification checks of the basic production function estimates. For all specifications, I report the results for the regression in levels, in first differences for the full sample, and in first differences for the balanced sample in 1993 and 1997.
In the top panel of the table, I assess whether the apparent lack of a correlation between the percentage immigrants and productivity is due to nonlinearities in the production function. For example, it could be that immigrants yield productivity gains only if they are in concentrated clusters where there can be knowledge spillovers. This conjecture is soundly rejected: the quadratic term is always small and insignificant, and including it never changes the fact that the linear term is also small and insignificant.
An alternative conjecture is that the effect of immigrants varies by firm size.
Again, this could be because knowledge spillovers can occur only in relatively large firms. The different specifications do not present a consistent pattern: in the regression in levels, it appears that the effect of immigrants is most pronouncedly negative in large establishments, while the differences specification suggests that the immigrant share has a negative effect on productivity especially in small firms. Overall, it is unlikely that the explanation for the lack of an effect of immigrant concentration on productivity lies in differences between small and large firms.
The next two panels investigate whether the effect of immigrants on productivity depends on the firm's level of technological intensity, and on the pre-existing level of skills at the industry level. 12 The third panel reveals that the share of immigrants is consistently negatively associated with productivity in low-tech industries, and the coefficient is always statistically significant at the 5 percent level. By contrast, there is some evidence for a positive effect of the immigrants share on productivity in high technology firms, especially in the first-difference specifications. However, the size and significance of the effect are sensitive to whether I use the full or the balanced sample.
The last panel in Table 11 paints a similar picture, although the results are somewhat less precise. There is some evidence that immigrant concentration is negatively correlated with productivity in industries that had a relatively low skill workforce prior to 20 the migration wave, and is positively correlated with productivity in industries with a high skilled workforce.
One last hypothesis deserves to be investigated: maybe only immigrants that are employed in occupations where their skills can really be put to good use (i.e., scientists) have a positive effect on productivity. I explore this possibility in Table 12 . For all three specifications (levels, first differences on the full sample, first differences on the balanced Tables 8 and 9 : small and insignificant in the levels specification, negative and significant in the first difference specification in the full sample, negative and insignificant in the first-difference specification in the balanced sample. The next panels of the table examine whether the effect of immigrant scientists differs by the type of industry. The correlation between the share of immigrants in other occupations and productivity is similar to the one found in Table 11 . Interestingly, though, we also find a strong negative correlation between the share of immigrant scientists and productivity in low-tech industries, suggesting that mismatched workers may be harmful for productivity. The effect of immigrant scientists in other technology categories is never statistically significant. Finally, splitting industries based on the level of education in 1989-1990 yields mostly insignificant coefficients. Altogether, there does not seem too 21 much evidence that immigrants employed as scientists had any positive effects on productivity, either overall or in specific industries.
Conclusion
This paper has studied whether the high-skilled migration wave from the former Soviet Union to Israel has had any effects on the productivity of Israeli manufacturing firms. Using a unique micro-level data set with information on standard measures of productivity and on the composition of the workforce, I found no evidence that a higher concentration of immigrants had any positive effects on firm productivity. This finding stands in contrast with the macroeconomic evidence, which revealed that the manufacturing sector employed a disproportionate share of immigrants and was the driving engine of economic growth in Israel in the 1990s. If anything, there is robust evidence that immigrant concentration was negatively related to productivity in lowtechnology industries. There is some evidence of a positive effect of immigrants on productivity in high technology industries, but the magnitude and significance of the results are sensitive to the econometric specification.
These results shed new light on the causes of growth in the Israeli economy in the 1990s, and casts doubt on the frequently voiced view that the high-skill immigration played a substantial role in boosting manufacturing productivity. It therefore appears that
Israel did not succeed in exploiting the extraordinary windfall in human capital represented by the Russian immigration to its full extent. Besides this direct contribution to our understanding of macroeconomic trends in the Israeli economy, there may be important lessons to be learned for other countries that plan to move towards a more skill-22 biased immigration policy. Is it indeed the case that a high proportion of high-skill immigrants would have large positive effects on productivity? Of course, the Israeli experience has some distinctive features that set it apart from other countries: first, the sheer magnitude of the migration wave made it more difficult for immigrants to find suitable jobs; second, many immigrants fled the disintegrating Soviet Union in haste, and with little prior knowledge of their chances to integrate successfully in the host country.
Nevertheless, the findings in this paper should lead one to pause and maybe re-evaluate whether there is always an automatic connection between high-skill immigration and the host country's productivity. Capital per worker TFP Manufacturing, 1990 Manufacturing, -1999 Labor, Capital, Production and TFP 1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997 Number of firms 1993 1993 1997 1997 Pooled, 1993 -1997 Pooled, 1993 -1997 Share immigrants 1990 -1993 1993 -1997 Pooled 1990 -1993 1993 -1997 1990-1993 and 1993-1997 First Differences, balanced sample, 1990-1993 and 1993-1997 Share Immigrants , where i denotes firm, j denotes industry, and t denotes time. These measures are calculated using all the available data from the Industrial Surveys from 1990 to 1999. , 1990-1993 and 1993-1997 First Differences, balanced sample, 1990-1993 and 1993-1997 1990-1993 and 1993-1997 First differences, balanced sample, 1990-1993 and 1993-1997 Share immigrant scientists Share immigrants other occ.
Share immigrant scientists
Share immigrants other occ.
Share immigrants other occ. 
